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Introduction

Traditionally, legal practitioners have been taught to present arguments in a straightforward
manner devoid of emotion or unnecessary details, especially when submitting written pleadings
(Farber & Sherry 1996, Lawshelf Educational Media n.d.). However, this is not the strategy one
sees deployed when reading the following excerpts: “Kenny A. is a two-year-old boy who is in
foster care...because of neglect” (Children’s Rights 2003, “Amended Complaint” 52-3); Maya C.,
a sixteen-year-old girl in foster care due to physical abuse, lives in “a dimly-lit cubicle...[with]
inadequate light, space and privacy for her to study or read...has no place to secure her property
and, as a result, many of her possessions have been stolen...[She] is regularly exposed to
dangerous, unsanitary and unhealthy conditions...and often sees roaches” (Children’s Rights 2003,
“Amended Complaint” 61); Phelicia D., a twelve-year-old girl in foster care, was “abused and
neglected and was a victim of child prostitution” (Children’s Rights 2003, “Amended Complaint”
65).
These are sentences one normally expects to find in a news story or novel; and yet, they
are direct quotations taken from Children’s Rights’ 125-page legal complaint which led to the class
action lawsuit Kenny A v. Deal, brought against the state of Georgia for the atrocities taking place
in its foster care system. This complaint is not an outlier among Children’s Rights’ work. Rather,
this approach to legal advocacy is consistently used by Children’s Rights across the 21cases it has
brought over the last 40 years. This style of complaint writing is salient for both rhetorical and
legal scholars for two main reasons. First, when one thinks of legal arguments, one normally
pictures compelling claims backed with facts and logic. Emotional appeals are often considered to
have no place in legal advocacy, especially in the pleadings that initiate the litigation. Typically,
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complaints are presented in a matter-of-fact manner that simply states facts without including
distracting, emotionally evocative details that are irrelevant to the substance of the argument
(Lawshelf Educational Media n.d., Legal Writing Center n.d.). However, Children’s Rights’
complaints strategically use facts combined with specific heartbreaking stories of children abused
in the various state foster care system to build its cases. This goes against what is traditionally
expected in a legal pleading. Second, when one thinks of advocacy, one usually pictures marches
and protests – actions that are outside of or against “the system” (the government/those in power).
However, Children’s Rights is advocating for reform using already existing legal channels within
the system to bring about change within the system. Both the unconventional use of rhetoric in
legal pleadings, and the fact that this advocacy movement is taking place within the system instead
of outside it, make Children’s Rights’ legal complaints salient rhetorical artifacts worth studying.
I argue that Children’s Rights innovates an effective rhetorical structure for bringing about
change through legal advocacy by strategically combining unconventional rhetorical strategies
within written legal pleadings to successfully appeal to audiences both within and beyond the legal
system. In this paper I will examine the use of pathos (emotional appeals) and logos (appeals based
on reason) in legal rhetoric, as represented by five Children’s Rights’ complaints, to identify ways
these types of rhetorical appeals can be combined with traditional legal argumentation to make a
successful, appealing case. First, I will provide background information about Children’s Rights’
work and the way its advocacy strategy has evolved over the decades. Second, I will review the
existing scholarship on the relationship between rhetoric and legal argumentation to contextualize
Children’s Rights’ innovative advocacy style. Third, I analyze five representative legal artifacts
from the online archive maintained by Children’s Rights to determine (1) the components of the
rhetorical situation within which the artifacts are situated, paying particular attention to audience;
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and (2) the ways pathos, ethos, and logos appear in each artifact. I conclude by discussing the
implications of my analysis and its importance for our understanding of legal rhetoric more
broadly.

History of Children’s Rights’ Legal Advocacy

The group I am studying is Children’s Rights, a nonprofit organization formed in 1995 out
of the New York Civil Liberties Union to advocate for reform in state foster care systems through,
as their website explains, “relentless strategic advocacy and legal action [to] hold governments
accountable for keeping kids safe and healthy.” Children’s Rights uses a variety of advocacy
methods to focus on both state-wide foster care reform and the special focus areas of LGBTQ
rights, psychotropics, and unaccompanied minors. The most interesting advocacy method used by
Children’s Rights is the legal pleadings it writes to initiate both class action and individual
lawsuits. It is through these documents that we see Children’s Rights employ a nontraditional
legal-writing style that breaks conventional legal advocacy norms.
Children’s Rights is composed of senior and regular staff, a board of directors, an advisory
council, a southern steering committee, and a young professional leadership council (Children’s
Rights 2020, “Children’s Rights”). In addition to its staff and legal teams, Children’s Rights hosts
events to raise awareness of its work and provides the opportunity for people to give donations to
help fund its campaigns. It has an extensive, up-to-date website that it uses to disseminate
information about its advocacy efforts and has active social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook,
and Instagram.
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On its website, Children’s Rights has detailed records of its press releases, publications,
fact sheets regarding aging out of the foster care system, finding permanent families, child abuse
and neglect, and foster care, and detailed records of all its legal cases, with an overview of each
case, all legal documents related to the case (including the original case complaint), and all
recorded media coverage. Each of Children’s Rights’ twenty-one class action lawsuits is named
after a child and uses personal stories of children abused in state foster care systems, combined
with facts and statistics about violations of these systems’ laws, to make a compelling argument
through the courts partially directed at state foster care providers calling for necessary changes in
child welfare systems across the United States. Children’s Rights’ website serves a secondary
function as well, helping Children’s Rights also address a broader public audience to raise
awareness of its work in a way that enables the organization to combine traditional and legal
advocacy methods. Without its online presence, the majority of Children’s Rights’ advocacy work
would be restricted to the legal sphere. However, having a website and social media accounts
enable it to make its work more widely accessible and publish regular updates about its successes.
This allows Children’s Rights to share its efforts with an external, non-legal audience, thereby
addressing the dilemma faced by many advocacy organizations – having to decide whether to focus
one’s efforts primarily toward audiences within or beyond the legal arena.
The primary source for my rhetorical artifacts is Children’s Rights’ online legal archive
cataloging each class action lawsuit with its accompanying documents. Utilizing the materials
available there, I will be analyzing the following five legal complaints filed by Children’s Rights
over the past four decades: G.L. v. Sherman (1977 – the first complaint recorded on file on
Children’s Rights’ website), Juan F. v. Malloy (1989), Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie (1999),
D.G. v. Yarbrough (2008), and H.G. v. Carroll (2018). I chose these complaints because, after
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conducting a precursory analysis of each and comparing them closely, I determined that they serve
as a representative sample of Children’s Rights’ rhetorical legal advocacy strategy. These cases
illustrate the general rhetorical approach Children’s Rights has embraced relatively consistently,
as well as the ways its particular rhetorical strategies have evolved over the years. These
complaints are representative not only of the stylistic evolution of Children’s Rights’ work but
also are spaced out over relatively even intervals (ten-year periods) since the organization’s
inception.
Children’s Rights 1977 G. L. v. Sherman complaint marks the first use of Children’s
Rights’ broader rhetorical approach to legal advocacy. This complaint was filed in Jackson County,
Missouri, on behalf of five plaintiffs and the class at large. It is twenty-three pages long and
structured like a traditional legal pleading, relying primarily on facts and statistics rather than
emotional appeals. It has no narrative quality; rather, it focuses on stating facts and concisely
articulating what laws and rules have been violated to justify the plea for the state to step in and
reform Missouri’s foster care system. There does not appear to be any attempt to personalize the
complaint to tug at the audience’s heartstrings. Rather, only an average of one to two pages is spent
sharing the story of each child, and each detailed description of abuse is presented in a matter-offact, concise way.
The second complaint, Juan F. v. Malloy (1989), takes place in Connecticut on behalf of
nine named plaintiffs, all other present and future children in the Connecticut child welfare system,
and any child not in the system at risk of maltreatment. Although this complaint is similar to G.L.
v. Sherman in the way it begins by presenting each plaintiff’s name in a matter-of-fact manner
rather than giving detailed narratives of each child as they are introduced, we begin to see
Children’s Rights introduce pathos in this complaint. Starting on page sixteen, it spends the next
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twenty-two pages detailing each child’s story, bringing an important emotional aspect to an
otherwise logos-heavy complaint. Juan F. v. Malloy is also significantly longer than G.L. v.
Sherman (eighty-six pages as compared to twenty-three).
Fast-forwarding another decade, the Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie 1999 complaint takes
place in New Jersey on behalf of seven named plaintiffs, the more than 9,000 children in the New
Jersey child welfare system, and the tens of thousands of other children across the state at risk of
maltreatment. In this complaint we again see a shift in the rhetorical strategy deployed by
Children’s Rights. Rather than having an introduction, this complaint goes straight into naming
the plaintiffs. After providing this information, it then goes into its introduction where it details
the reasons for the complaint and sets the stage for more in-depth renditions of the plaintiffs’
stories. Each story is relayed in extensive detail that, while heartbreaking and memorable, is not
necessary for the legal aspect of the complaint, since at the end of each plaintiff’s story there is a
summary paragraph that details the legal violations outlined above. As my analysis will suggest,
the specific details of each plaintiff’s story potentially function more to capture the reader’s
attention and pull at their heartstrings than to establish legal precedent or make a legal argument,
since that could be accomplished by merely sharing the final paragraph of each plaintiff’s section.
This complaint is fifty-two pages long and spends about two to four pages on each child/sibling
group’s story. This is twice as many pages as Children’s Rights used to share its plaintiff’s stories
in its first case in 1977. In total, two-fifths (twenty-two pages) of the Charlie & Nadine H. v.
Christie complaint is spent conveying emotion-driven narratives about the plaintiffs’ abuses.
Similar to Juan F. v. Malloy, it uses pathos more significantly than the 1977 complaint but
ultimately still relies heavily on logical appeals and traditional legal argumentation based on facts,
data, and previous legal precedent.
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The 2008 complaint D.G. v. Yarbrough takes place in Oklahoma on behalf of nine named
plaintiffs and over 10,000 children in the Oklahoma child welfare system. In this complaint we see
a much stronger emotional appeal employed from the very beginning. Within the first page of its
introduction, the pleading tells a short, detailed, heartbreaking story about the abuses suffered by
a small girl called C.S. Including the story at the very beginning of the complaint is unnecessary
to establish the legality of the plaintiffs’ argument, since the complaint later spends thirty-two and
one-half pages detailing the abuses of each plaintiff further down in the document; however,
sharing C.S.’s story on the first page serves as a way to captivate the reader’s attention and
emotions. This rhetorical strategy relies more heavily on emotional appeals than logical arguments
when compared to the previous three complaints.
Finally, Children’s Rights’ most recent complaint I am analyzing is the 2018 H.G. v.
Carroll complaint, which takes place in the southern region of Florida on behalf of seven named
plaintiffs, the 2,000 children in the region’s foster care system, and all youths likely to soon be in
the system. In this complaint we see the greatest amount of emotional appeals incorporated out of
the five complaints under consideration. Especially when compared to Children’s Rights’ first case
from 1977, the contrast is stark. In its opening statement, H.G. v. Carroll tells the story of two girls
abused in the Florida foster care system who committed suicide. There is a specific footnote at the
end of page 3 stating, “Neither of these deceased Minors nor their estates are plaintiffs herein,”
and yet, Children’s Rights still decided to include these girls’ stories in its complaint. This
information is not necessary to build the case, but it definitely attracts the reader’s attention and
invites an emotional reaction. The section detailing each plaintiff’s unique story stretches from
page 5 to page 30, spending up to nine pages on each child. This is a stark contrast to the consistent
one to two pages spent on each child in the G.L. v. Sherman complaint. Something else interesting
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to note about the 2018 complaint is that there are several sentences and phrases throughout where
Children’s Rights has bolded and italicized the text to draw the reader’s attention to these sections.
This is unnecessary from the legal standpoint of crafting one’s case, as the information is the same
whether it is visually emphasized or not. However, accentuating the text has an effect on the
reader’s interaction with the complaint and causes greater attention to be placed on these sections
– sections that lend themselves to inciting emotional responses from the reader.
The progressive increased reliance on emotional appeals throughout Children’s Rights’
complaints over the past forty years should intrigue scholars of legal rhetoric because it falls so far
outside of the rhetorical conventions of legal arguments in traditional complaints. As will be
explained in the literature review section, within the legal system, there is rarely anything to gain
from writing extensive complaints. Rather, crafting long complaints can actually serve as a
disservice since it could appear that the complaint writer does not understand how to adhere to the
conventions of this rhetorical genre, and the reader could be less likely to read the document in its
entirety. In the rhetorical analysis of these artifacts, I will examine the points of similarity and
difference within and among the complaints to identify ways that the Children’s Rights rhetorical
legal advocacy approach can be generalized and applied to other similar advocacy campaigns.
However, this analysis requires first understanding how the intentional incorporation of rhetoric
in legal argumentation has been viewed among both the rhetorical and legal scholarly
communities.
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Theorizing the Rhetorical Dimensions of Legal Argument

In order to understand how Children’s Rights’ legal advocacy method is innovative,
thereby identifying ways similar organizations can replicate this strategy and scholars can further
explore rhetoric as a part of legal argumentation, we must establish three things. First, what is the
rhetorical context and lens through which these complaints will be analyzed? Second, what is the
relationship and history both rhetoricians and legal scholars have with combining rhetoric and
legal argumentation, specifically with regard to the use of logos, pathos, and ethos? Third, how is
the structure of a legal complaint different from that of legal cases, which are what is commonly
thought of when one considers legal argumentation? These three points are important to establish
so we can better understand how the larger scholarly conversation regarding the relationship
between rhetoric and the law helps explain some of the innovative ways Children’s Rights
approaches conducting advocacy work through the legal system.
Lloyd Bitzer’s (1968) theory of the rhetorical situation provides the foundation on which
my analysis is built because it equips us to understand the interplay between rhetorical context and
discourse. Bitzer (1968) defines a rhetorical situation as “a complex of persons, events, objects,
and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as
to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (6). The term exigence refers to “an
imperfection marked by urgency ... a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing
which is other than it should be” (Bitzer 1968, 6). A rhetorical exigence is one in which the
problem can only be improved or solved through discourse (Bitzer 1968, 6). If a problem exists,
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but discourse cannot help resolve it, it does not qualify as being a rhetorical exigence (Bitzer 1968,
6).
Within a rhetorical situation, there are three main components: (1) the exigence that led to
the situation in the first place, (2) “the audience to be constrained in decision and action, and [(3)]
the constraints which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience” (Bitzer
1968, 6). Bitzer (1968) theorizes the audience as those individuals who can be “distinguished from
a body of mere hearers or readers: properly speaking, a rhetorical audience consists only of those
persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (7).
Understanding the rhetorical exigence, audience, and constraints within which Children’s Rights
is operating will be important when analyzing their complaints. As we will see in my close analysis
of Children’s Rights’ work, Bitzer’s perspective helps us make sense of the unexpected rhetorical
choices of Children’s Rights’ legal advocacy. When examining Children’s Rights’ complaints, one
can see that the rhetorical exigence arises from the thousands of children being abused and
overlooked in the different state foster care systems. Rhetorical discourse is necessary to raise
awareness of this problem and lead the federal government to step in and resolve this issue.
In addition to the broader theoretical perspective Bitzer offers, which is a sort of global
view that takes all features of a rhetorical situation into account, we also need a micro view that
demonstrates how individual rhetorical strategies operate in a broader rhetorical situation. One
aspect of this micro view is the three artistic proofs (pisteis) which I will examine specifically in
Children’s Rights’ legal complaints. These pisteis are pathos, ethos, and logos. Pathos can be
explained as efforts to influence an audience’s emotions, or, as Aristotle (1991) states,
“[persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion by the speech” (1356a). Ethos
can be described as performing the character of the speaker. Logos refers to forming arguments
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from reason, which is what is typically thought of when referring to legal argumentation. This can
be done in several ways, including paradigmatic arguments, which Aristotle (1991) explains as
“show[ing] on the basis of many similar instances that something is so” (1356b), and syllogistic
arguments, which are formed through deductive reasoning. I will be focusing primarily on the use
of paradigmatic and syllogistic arguments within Children’s Rights’ complaints.
In addition to understanding the rhetorical situation and the individual concepts of logos,
pathos, and ethos, it is also important to understand the relationship and history both rhetors and
legal scholars have with rhetoric and the law. Recognizing that legal proceedings are themselves
a rhetorical situation, one that has markedly different exigence, audiences, and constraints than the
court of public opinion, can help legal practitioners more effectively convey their arguments.
Unfortunately, legal scholars have not always been willing to acknowledge this connection
between rhetoric and the law.
According to Anapol (1970), the original reason rhetoric emerged as a civic practice and
field of study was for legal purposes: “[T]he need to present cases in court was a basic reason for
the development of rhetoric in classical Greece” (1). However, ancient rhetoricians disagreed on
what rhetorical artifacts should be included in legal reasoning. For example, Aristotle believed
forensic arguments should be based on facts alone and emotions should be left out of legal
argument whenever possible (Anapol 1970, 1) while Cicero argued in favor of using emotional
appeals in legal rhetoric since people respond more to feeling than logic, and the best way to fight
feeling is with other feelings (Anapol 1970, 3).
Once the Greek and Roman empires fell, attitudes toward using any form of rhetoric in
legal reasoning, emotional or otherwise, changed. In response to the “pagan ways” of the Greeks
and Romans, the Catholic Church attempted to purify Europe by shunning the use of rhetoric in
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legal practices during the Middle Ages. Under the feudal system, brute strength was valued over
legal argumentation. According to Anapol (1970), “Such rhetoric as existed was practiced mainly
in the sermons of the priests and in the work of the professional writers of letters … It was under
these conditions that men almost completely lost sight of the once intimate connection between
law and rhetoric” (4-5). Due to the challenges of hostility from the church, and the overall decline
of literacy and education during the medieval period, the concept of rhetoric that survived this
period was distinctly different from that of the Greco-Roman period (Anapol 1970, 5). This change
in the relationship between rhetoric and legal argumentation lingered long after the Middle Ages.
As law and rhetoric continued to develop separately, the problem arose in the early
American legal system that “the law student was trained almost exclusively in the searching out
and the interpretation of legal cases bearing upon the subject he was considering, [which] produced
a lawyer who was more at home in the law library than in the courtroom” (Anapol 1970, 6). Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt complained that this led to fewer lawyers being able to actually
communicate (“General Education and Law Training in the Making of a Great Lawyer” as cited
in Anapol 1970, 6). This dilemma prompted a push for increased incorporation of the study and
effective use of rhetoric in legal argumentation, and eventually rhetorical practice became more
widely accepted in the modern American legal system. However, this history of shunning rhetoric
in the early American legal system still lingers today. While most lawyers accept certain forms of
rhetoric in legal argumentation, they are more hesitant of others, especially the use of emotional
appeals (Farber & Sherry 1996; Greene 2013).
According Levine and Saunders (1993), modern lawyers deploy logos, ethos, and pathos
in both oral arguments and written briefs since arguments based on logic rely primarily on
deductively applying rules to facts and “the analogizing of precedents”; emotional appeals rely on

12

“a court’s sense of fairness, sympathies, or desire to avoid a harsh result”; and ethical arguments
establish a sense of “credibility, accuracy, and good faith on the part of lawyer and client” (Levine
& Saunders 1993, 4). Frost (1988) echoes this sentiment by arguing that modern lawyers “employ
classical rhetorical devices even at the paragraph and sentence level to make arguments more
effective. Antithesis and parallelism are especially favored as means of juxtaposing and contrasting
rulings, facts, and policies” (412).
However, consistent with Anapol’s (1970) writings, Levine and Saunders (1993) go on to
explain that “[c]onceptual frameworks for understanding the relationship between rhetoric and the
law are not currently represented in law school curricula” (Levine & Saunders 1993, 10). Berger
(2010) reinforces this, stating that most second- or third-year law students focus their legal analysis
on “what they regard as the only relevant questions: What’s the rule? What facts are relevant under
the rule? Given the rule and the facts, what arguments could you make? What’s the right answer?”
without giving thought to the rhetorical situation, which “might be considered wholly irrelevant in
legal analysis” (15).
Rather than studying legal arguments through a rhetorical lens, Levi (1948) explains that
most law students are taught to argue case law and the interpretation of statutes and the
Constitution by reasoning from example or comparing facts from case to case (501). He explains
it as a “three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive
of the first case is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps
are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case” (Levi 1948, 501-2). Farber
and Sherry (1996) explain further that rhetorical strategies such as storytelling or emotional
appeals are often especially frowned upon in legal circles, because “storytelling has been the object
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of resistance in the legal academy ... Law, too, has often been seen as the province – whether in
reality or only in aspiration – of reason rather than emotion” (50). This is due to the belief that
reason is superior to rhetoric, which leads legal scholars to favor “the rational aspects of language
over the emotive” (Farber & Sherry 1996, 50).
Keeping in line with Farber and Sherry’s (1996) claim that storytelling and emotional
appeals are especially unfavorable in constitutional arguments, Greene (2013) explains that some
scholars who study constitutional law “typically ignore or dismiss emotional appeal as a standard
mode of persuasion” (3). Philip Bobbitt, a taxonomist of constitutional argument, states that
pathetic argument “has to do with the idiosyncratic, personal traits and thus reflects one feature of
illegitimate judicial opinions which is often confounded with [ethical argument]” (quoted in
Greene 2013, 3).
However, Greene disagrees with this viewpoint, claiming that “appeals to pathos are an
important element of constitutional practice” (Greene 2013, 5) since “pathetic argument is
essential to lawmaking because emotion is integral to public morality” (Greene 2013, 7). Greene
(2013) argues that the use of pathos is inevitable because it is impossible to live in a world devoid
of emotion; therefore, instead of denying that pathos exists in legal rhetoric, Greene contends it is
better to “develop and support a set of best pathetic practices. Treating emotional appeals as
forbidden allows them to proceed when unnoticed” (71).
Greene’s (2013) point of view is supported by the American Bar Association, which states
in its 2001 handbook, The Winning Argument, that a lawyers should “associate [their] case with
[their] listener’s values … frame issues in emotionally compelling terms … recognize that judges
are subject to emotion … [and be] sensitive to your listeners’ feelings” (quoted in Greene 2013,
17). Based on this, Greene argues that “an American lawyer’s professional duties at least permit
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and may require him to offer a pathetic argument whenever he believes such an argument is more
likely than not to advance his client’s interests” (Greene 2013, 18). However, when pathetic
appeals are made, the moral implications of appealing to the audience’s emotions must be taken
into consideration.
According to Greene, emotional appeals are accepted, and often welcomed, in legal
rhetoric when dealing with criminal law. Examples of how pathos can be used include “[p]leas for
mercy based on childhood trauma, dependent partners and children, good deeds, amicability, or
other factors” (Greene 2013, 14). In this case, pathos is used to incite feelings of pity and mercy
in the judge and jury by drawing attention to the external circumstances that affected the
defendant’s behavior to show that the defendant is actually a victim him- or herself. Of course,
Children’s Rights is not engaging in rhetorical messaging to defend an individual. Rather, it is
using pathetic appeals in a different way. First, its pathetic appeals are used in legal pleadings
rather than case or criminal law. Second, its emotional appeals are meant to direct the judge’s
attention toward the suffering of the plaintiffs by telling stories of childhood trauma and other
external factors exercised against the plaintiff, rather than the defendant. Understanding how
rhetoric and legal argumentation have traditionally worked together helps highlight the many ways
Children’s Rights’ advocacy work through the legal system is presented in an innovative,
nontraditional, but successful, manner that can potentially be used as a model for other advocacy
groups attempting to conduct similar work.
As mentioned above, Children’s Rights is not arguing a legal case but rather a legal
complaint. The way it structures its complaints is unconventional from the traditional way a
complaint is written. According to the Legal Writing Center at the CUNY School of Law, “The
legal function of the Complaint is primary: it alleges facts necessary to state all elements of a legal
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claim … the language should be clear and precise.” Law Shelf Educational Media, a project of the
National Paralegal College, explains that a complaint should be a “concise and plain statement of
the factual allegations” with “the purpose of a complaint [being] to set forth, in a concise,
straightforward, and logical manner, the relevant facts that support particular legal claims and that
entitle you to specific relief, such as damages or an injunction.” Considering that a precursory
examination of the five Children’s Rights’ complaints I am analyzing shows that they are
extremely long documents with numerous narrative renditions of children’s suffering in the foster
care system, it appears already that Children’s Rights does not employ the traditional structure for
legal complaints and instead strays away from legal argumentation focused mainly on precedent
and facts to intentionally include pathetic appeals and narrative storytelling.
With this in mind, I believe rhetorical and legal scholars should ask themselves the
following two questions when examining artifacts similar to mine. First: What is the rhetorical
situation within which this artifact is situated and who is (are) the audience(s) being appealed to?
Second: How are pathos, ethos, and logos used in this artifact? In the analysis that follows, I use
these lines of rhetorical inquiry to interrogate the five representative complaints from the
Children’s Rights online archive.

The Rhetorical Situation and Pisteis in Children’s Rights’ Complaints

Recall that Bitzer theorizes a rhetorical situation as composed of three parts: the exigence,
audience, and constraints. I begin my analysis by identifying these constituent elements of the
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rhetorical situation in which Children’s Rights’ legal advocacy operates. First, the exigence that
produced the need for legal advocacy was the fact that every day, tens of thousands of children
languish unnoticed in state foster care systems across the United States. These children are under
the guardianship of state governments that are responsible for caring for and protecting them, and
these systems are failing. However, very little (if any) awareness is being raised about these
appalling conditions, and no significant actions are being taken on the part of the state governments
to improve their foster care systems. This situation is clearly articulated on page 3 of Children’s
Rights’ 2018 annual report where it draws attention to the fact that half a million children are under
the protection of governments that are actually harming the children they are meant to protect.
Since these children are “powerless to defend themselves within systems that function out of public
view” (3), Children’s Rights must step in and use rhetoric through legal advocacy to expose these
systems and bring about positive change for all foster youth in the United States.
In each complaint I am analyzing, we find support justifying the claim that this rhetorical
situation’s exigence results from thousands of children languishing in state foster care systems.
The first complaint, G. L. v. Sherman, gestures towards the fact that this is a class of children put
at a disadvantage by saying, “The plaintiffs, on their own behalf, and on behalf of the class which
they seek to represent, seek permanent injunctive and declaratory relief to remedy the conditions
of their foster homes” (1977, 2, emphasis added). They later indicate a more specific number,
stating: “The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical in that, as of this date,
there are over 100 children in the class” (G. L. v. Sherman 1977, 5-6). Juan F. v. Malloy opens by
saying, “This is a civil rights class action brought by and on behalf of Connecticut’s most
vulnerable citizens – all abused, neglected, and at risk children who are in the custody, care, or
supervision of the defendant … as well as all other children who have been abused, neglected, or

17

abandoned or are at risk of such maltreatment” (1989, 1). This includes not only the children
specified by name but also “many thousands of children at any one time” (Juan F. v. Malloy 1989,
10). In 1989, the number of cases served each month by the Connecticut Department of Children
and Youth Services had “increased to more than 14,000” (Juan F. v. Malloy 1989, 39) and specific
cases involving physical and/or sexual abuse, neglect, abandonment, or being at risk of these
dangers had risen in the past year to “13,090 cases involving 20,233 children” (Juan F. v. Malloy
1989, 40). The number of children who were in out-of-home placements in January 1989 was
3,612 (Juan F. v. Malloy 1989, 41).
In Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie, the class included “all children who are or will be in
the custody of the Division” of Child Protective Services (1999, 3). A specific number of
approximately 9,250 children is given as the size of the plaintiff class (Charlie & Nadine H. v.
Christie 1999, 5). D. G. v. Yarbrough begins by saying its case is “brought by the Named Plaintiffs,
nine children in foster care, on behalf of themselves and the more than 10,000 children in
Oklahoma who have been removed from their home by the state … DHS [the Oklahoma
Department of Human Services] …have failed in their basic and fundamental duty to provide for
the safety and care of these Oklahoma citizens” (2008, 1). The final complaint, H.G. v. Carroll,
declares approximately 3,500 children are in foster care custody under the Florida Department of
Children and Families (DCF), and these children are enduring “ongoing harms, and risks of harm,
to themselves and other foster children in DCF custody” (2018, 4). Taken together, all these
quotations show that Children’s Rights views the exigence as being the failure of state
governments to protect the tens of thousands of children under their custody. Because this can only
be remedied through the legal system, a rhetorical response is needed.
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Regarding this rhetorical situation’s audience, Children’s Rights’ work is directed at two
main groups: those within the legal system and those outside it. On the surface, it appears as though
Children’s Rights’ complaints are solely focused on a legal audience. This is supported in two
ways. First, Children’s Rights specifically names government officials in each complaint. The G.
L. v. Sherman (1977, 4-5) case calls out the state directors of the Missouri Division of Family
Services, county office directors, and the social service supervisor of the Missouri Divisions of
Family Services. Juan F. v. Malloy (1989, 9) charges the governor of Connecticut and
commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services with having failed
the children under their care. Charles & Nadine H. v. Christie (1999, 2-3) name its case’s
defendants as the governor of New Jersey, the New Jersey commissioner of the Department of
Human Services, and the director of the Division of Youth and Family Services. In D. G. v.
Yarbrough (2008, page 10-12), charges are leveled against the governor of Oklahoma and various
other state officials directly employed through the Oklahoma Commission for Human Services.
Lastly, in H. G. v. Carroll (2018, 30-1), Mike Carroll, Secretary of the Florida Department of
Children and Families, is the named defendant. Along with these government officials, each
complaint is also directed toward a second legal audience – a judge and jury in a federal court
(rather than state court).
In addition to the two above-mentioned legal audiences, the fact that Children’s Rights’
complaints do not follow the traditional structure of a legal pleading but instead are far longer and
more emotion-laden raises questions about the fittingness of its rhetorical response. It would not
seem to be expedient to break traditional complaint-writing norms when directing one’s argument
solely at a legal audience. If anything, veering away from “proper” formatting might frustrate or
annoy a legal audience. However, including long detailed stories of specific children in each
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complaint makes sense if one considers Children’s Rights’ secondary audience as being those
outside the legal system. The availability of the complaints and accompanying documentation and
resources on the Children’s Rights’ website suggests its rhetorical appeals are designed to circulate
far beyond the formal institutions of the legal system. Not only does Children’s Rights make each
full complaint available online so anyone can access it, it also has an entire “In the News” section
dedicated to media coverage related to its cases. This shows how Children’s Rights’ arguments
generated in a legal context are being disseminated beyond the courtroom and the initial legal
audience through journalists covering these cases (Ballentine, 2019; Langford, 2014; O’Donnell,
2018). Even while directing its arguments at a legal audience, Children’s Rights is also crafting its
messages in a way that potentially appeals to and is accessible for those outside the legal system.
The fact that the rhetorical situation Children’s Rights is facing has two audiences means
its response has to speak to both. I argue that the choice to include detailed stories of specific
children, even though that information is unnecessary for crafting a strong legal argument, actually
represents a prudent rhetorical choice. While non-legal readers may not understand the argument
of precedent or the various laws or rules that have been violated, they can understand the suffering
of a specific child. In a brochure available on its website, Children’s Rights clarifies that its legal
advocacy is directed at an external, non-legal audience by stating, “We build cases that expose
pervasive failures” (2015, 5). Obviously, the failing state governments are already aware of the
flaws in their systems. It is the everyday citizenry that are oblivious to what is occurring and to
whom state governments need to be exposed. Understanding the duality of the audiences to whom
Children’s Rights’ legal advocacy is directed can help explain the efficacy of its decisions
regarding how to structure, and break, conventional legal complaint-writing norms.
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The final component of the rhetorical situation is the constraints under which Children’s
Rights is operating. While advocating for statewide foster care reform through the legal system
may be a successful, effective way to accomplish its work, Children’s Rights is still limited in how
it can craft and distribute its arguments based on the legal framework in which it has chosen to
operate. Although its complaints do deviate somewhat from the “traditional” complaint structure,
Children’s Rights can only stray so far from “acceptable” legal practices before it is not taken
seriously, and its work is dismissed. Not only does this affect the way its advocacy work is
presented, but it also limits how much reform Children’s Rights can push for. Once its cases have
been ruled on, Children’s Rights must abide by the decision of the judge and jury. The legal system
moves very slowly, and it often takes years for any case to be closed. Since Children’s Rights is
operating within this system, it is limited in how quickly it can bring about change. Additionally,
since Children’s Rights does direct its work at two very different audiences, it must strive twice as
hard to disseminate its work through multiple channels most appropriate for reaching both groups.
Children’s Rights can neither only advocate through the legal system nor only in the public eye. It
must find the balance that effectively spreads its message to both groups. This is demonstrated
through its website. Accompanying each lawsuit is an “overview” page that explains in lay terms
what the case is about and what progress has been made so far. Children’s Rights is constrained to
intentionally provide information appropriate for both audiences in order to be as effective as
possible in its advocacy efforts to reach both groups.
Navigating this challenging and unconventional rhetorical situation requires Children’s
Rights to get inventive with its deployment of traditional rhetorical appeals. In the analysis that
follows, I investigate how the rhetorical pisteis of logos, pathos, and ethos are used throughout
each complaint to address the factors identified in the rhetorical situation. The first pisteis we will
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examine at-length is logos: arguments created from reason. Children’s Rights’ use of logos
employs a combination of inductive and deductive rhetorical reasoning as manifested through two
forms: (1) paradigmatic arguments, which “ show on the basis of many similar instances that
something is so” (Aristotle 1991, 1365b), and (2) syllogistic arguments, which are arguments
formed through deductive reasoning.
Since Children’s Rights is disputing its cases as class action lawsuits in federal court,
arguing not for one child but on behalf of thousands whom it claims have all had their
constitutional rights violated, they must first provide support to demonstrate that the violations
they are claiming occurred are not one-off events but rather display a consistent pattern of abuse.
This in turn will help support Children’s Rights’ overall argument that the Constitution protects
certain rights, and these rights are clearly, repeatedly being violated by failing state governments’
child welfare systems. Understanding the legal constraints within which Children’s Rights is
operating and the legal audience it is appealing to helps explain why each legal complaint presents
numerous detailed renditions of individual children’s stories, repeatedly using almost identical
wording to express the legal violations occurring in each complaint to demonstrate that the
violations are similar and, when combined, form a larger history of sustained abuse. Because
paradigmatic argument relies on the demonstration of similarity between discrete cases, the
rhetorical strategy of repeating similar factual statements of grievances multiple times for different
cases creates a strong argument. Evidence of the way Children’s Rights strategically uses logos
through paradigmatic arguments can be found in each complaint under review and is best
illustrated by the following example pulled from the Juan F. v. Malloy complaint:
Defendants have violated Juan’s federal and statutory constitutional rights, including: by
failing to make reasonable efforts to avoid the need for foster care placement, by failing to
timely develop and implement written treatment plans which contain the requisite
elements, by failing to provide timely and appropriate services or make other efforts to
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implement DCYS’ plan of adoption, by failing to provide him with proper care and
adequate services, by separating him from his siblings, and by failing to protect him from
harm. As a result of these violations of his rights, Juan has been deprived of the opportunity
for healthy development and a normal childhood, and has been, and continues to be,
irreparably harmed. (1989, 19)
This quotation illustrates the general paradigmatic form used repeatedly in Children’s Rights’ legal
rhetoric. Each of the individual children’s stories (nine in total) presented in Juan F. v. Malloy
begin with the same phrase: “Defendants have violated [the child’s] federal and statutory
constitutional rights,” (1989, 19; 26; 30; 33; 37) creating a sense of similarity across cases.
However, the specific detailed violations, such as failing to make reasonable efforts to avoid the
need for foster care placement and failing to provide proper care and adequate services, are unique
to each child or sibling-group and provide support for the inference of one general conclusion: the
state foster care systems are negligent in meeting their legal duties and have violated the children’s
legal rights.
This same paradigmatic style of argumentation is used throughout the other four
complaints being analyzed. In G. L. v. Sherman, each child’s individual narrative (five in total)
ends with almost identical wording: “The injuries and suffering and inadequate care described
above was and is the proximate result of defendants’ violations of their duties under the Missouri
and United States Constitutions and federal and state statutes and regulations” (1977, 12; 13; 14;
15, emphasis added). Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie ends each individual claim (seven in total)
with the following phrases: “As a result of the defendants' actions and inactions, Charlie and
Nadine have been and continue to be irreparably harmed … Defendants have violated [children’s
names] constitutional and statutory rights … all of which are required by law and by reasonable
professional standards” (1999, 13-14; 15;17; 23; 25; 26; 31, emphasis added).
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D. G. v. Yarbrough (2008) formats its complaint differently from the others. Rather than
sharing the individual children’s stories first and then stating the complaints’ main, overarching
charges, this complaint first states its charges, supported with facts and statistics, and then provides
the individual children’s stories as supporting evidence for its argument. However, even though
D. G. v. Yarbrough (2008) formats itself differently from the others, the ending of its section
detailing each child’s story is still consistent with what has been seen previously. Each child’s
story ends with a long paragraph, summarizing the violations enumerated in greater detail in the
complaint’s preceding paragraphs. All claims of violations are formatted identically, simply citing
differences in the charges depending on each child’s unique case. No matter the different
particulars of each child’s situation, every concluding paragraph begins with the phrase “DHS’s
policies and practices have caused irreparable harm and continue to subject [the child] to the
imminent risk of irreparable harm” (2008, 45; 49; 52; 53; 58; 61; 66; 71; 76, emphasis added).
The repetition of an identical inference at the end of the list of violations encourages the audience
to reason paradigmatically across each individual unit of argument making up the larger complaint.
In the final complaint under analysis, H. G. v. Carroll (2018), Children’s Rights again uses
paradigmatic arguments to provide evidence for its overarching claim that the plaintiffs’
Constitutional rights have been violated. To support the argument that all children within the class
experience similar violations, the final paragraph in each plaintiffs’ individual section begins and
ends with this identical verbiage (only the name changes each time): “Defendant’s actions and
inactions, policies, patterns, customs, and/or practices have violated and continue to violate H.G.
and M.G.’s substantive due process and federal statutory rights … H.G. and M.G. continue to be
at risk of harm as a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, policies, patterns, customs, and/or
practices” (2018, 6-7; 8; 16-17; 20-21; 25; 30). This wording does not vary across the seven
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plaintiffs specifically named in this complaint. The examples of paradigmatic arguments deployed
in each of Children’s Rights’ complaints demonstrate one way that logos is used in Children’s
Rights’ legal argumentation strategy. It is evident that logos is relied on heavily in the rhetorical
approach used for these legal arguments.
Once Children’s Rights has used paradigmatic arguments to support its claim that the
grievances occurring are frequent and common to those in the legal class, thereby showing its
claim must be true based on the inference from the evidence that so many similar violations are
occurring, Children’s Rights is then positioned to make syllogistic arguments citing a particular
state or federal law and/or regulation/section of the United State Constitution as its major premise,
referencing as its minor premise the evidence provided through the individual stories, in order to
deduce that the plaintiff has violated the children’s constitutional rights. In this way, the
paradigmatic and syllogistic arguments work hand in hand to advance the overall argumentative
case being presented in the complaint. Evidence of this syllogistic supplement to the paradigmatic
arguments can be seen in each complaint being studied. We will now closely examine a
representative example from the D. G. v. Yarbrough complaint:
A state assumes an affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution to protect a child from harm when it takes that child into its foster
care custody. The foregoing policies and practices of Defendants...constitute a failure to
meet the affirmative duty to protect from harm and to keep reasonably free from harm all
Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Children... As a result, all Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiff
Children have been harmed and are at continuing and imminent risk of harm, and have
been deprived of the substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (2008, 77-8)
This example is structured syllogistically because it presents a major premise and a minor premise,
and then reasons deductively to reach its claim. In the above example, the major premise is that
the state has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to protect
the children under its care from harm. The minor premise concerns the specific complaint being
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presented and argues that the policies and practices of defendants, demonstrated through the
aforementioned paradigmatic arguments, have failed to protect children from harm. Therefore, the
audience can deduce that the state is violating the plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights as defined by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This exact argument structure is portrayed in both the Juan F. v. Malloy
(1989, 78) and H. G. v. Carroll (2018, 58-9) complaints.
Some variations to this structure of arguments are seen in two of the cases: G. L. v. Sherman
(1977) and Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie (1999). In G. L. v. Sherman, there is a much more
detailed syllogistic argument with four minor premises to accompany the major premise (1977,
19). A much more significant variation can be seen in the Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie (1999)
complaint. In this example, rather than laying out its paradigmatic argument first, Children’s
Rights states the major premises of its syllogistic argument on pages nine through ten and then
utilizes each individual child’s story to support its minor premise (for illustration, see pages 13,
23, 25, and 27). It is not until after each of these mini-syllogistic arguments have been made that
this complaint then concludes its paradigmatic argument from the aforementioned syllogistic
arguments (Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie 1999, 46). This is a reversal of the specific method
syllogism and paradigm are intertwined in the other complaints. However, in general, each of the
included examples from the various complaints demonstrate how Children’s Rights consistently
uses syllogistic arguments to strategically incorporate logos into its legal rhetoric.
After examining the above sections, it is easy to see that logos is the dominant rhetorical
pisteis used throughout Children’s Rights’ complaints. However, this in and of itself is not
especially noteworthy, since one expects legal arguments to be logos heavy. What is notable is the
way each complaint incorporates pathos into its logical appeals. As we saw earlier in the
scholarship on legal rhetoric, storytelling and emotional appeals have been resisted in the legal
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profession, giving preference to rational arguments rather than emotive ones (Farber & Sherry
1996, 50). Interestingly enough, Children’s Rights freely deploys both storytelling and emotional
appeals in its complaints. This is most evident in the sections using paradigmatic arguments
sharing individual children’s stories. These passages rely heavily on pathos, which helps humanize
the plaintiffs and makes the complaint come alive in a way that transforms the victims into relatable
and compelling individuals worth remembering and advocating for. This strategy helps these
complaints appeal to Children’s Rights’ external, non-legal audiences.
Pathos is incorporated into the paradigmatic arguments in multiple ways. One primary
strategy is through detailed, narrative, heart-rending stories like the following example:
Anna currently suffers from severe feelings of rejection and abandonment. She
continues to act out her frustration and anxiety and frequently inquires anxiously
about whether she can remain in her current placement, or if she again will have
to move. (Juan F. v. Malloy 1989, 29-30, emphasis added)
Providing descriptions of Anna’s emotions allows the audience to better relate to her and
experience a compassionate, empathetic response. In the next example, pathos is employed in a
way that emphasizes the unnatural abuses these children have endured, inviting a response of
righteous indignation and desire to justly punish the foster parent:
When [the children] were removed by DYFS from their mother’s custody because
of abuse and neglect, they were placed by DYFS in a foster home where they
were again neglected and abused, including being beaten with broomsticks and
curtain rods. (Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie 1999, 10, emphasis added)
Intentionally stating the children were beaten with broomsticks and curtain rods transforms benign
household items into weapons of violence against children instead of serving as symbols of a safe
domestic home. This use of pathos creates an emotional appeal that invests the audience in
assigning blame to the parents.
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Pathos is also used in Children’s Rights’ complaints to emphasize the horrors of the harms
visited on the plaintiffs by forcing the reader to envision what the outcome of such abuse looks
like:
It was not until October of 2007, when J.P. was brought to the hospital with
bruises all over his body caused by his foster mother whipping him with a belt,
that DHS finally removed him from this home. (D.G. v. Yarbrough 2008, 60,
emphasis added)
Graphically describing J.P.’s wounds paints a vivid picture for the audience that is not easily
dismissed and can be related to by most individuals who have experienced a less-severe version
of corporal punishment before. This invests the audience more personally in the experience of
these children and makes it possible for them to feel deeply about what these children are enduring.
In the next example of pathos, rather than employing a narrative style that helps the audience relate
to the child’s experience, the shared details serve to help the reader grasp the magnitude of horrific
experiences the child must have endured to end up exhibiting such self-harming behavior:
While living in his aunt’s home under DYFS supervision, Ricardo’s behavior
became increasingly disturbed, making clear his need for immediate treatment
and help. He attempted to drink Clorox, stuck his fingers in electrical sockets,
tried to throw himself in front of a moving car, and ran away from his aunt’s
home, hitchhiking on the New Jersey Turnpike. He said that he heard voices
telling him to do things and also saw monsters. (Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie
1999, 22)
The described behavior is not that typically exhibited by a child raised in a supportive, healthy
household. Through the inclusion of this excerpt, Children’s Rights is able to more fully convey
to its audience the extent of the plaintiff’s trauma. The final example of pathos inspires a futurelooking emotion in the audience by investing them in the child’s story and leaving them with
concern for what may happen to the plaintiff if her situation is not remedied:
On the way to the school, the foster mother told L.T. to get out of the car and left
her on the street with loose change and instructions to take the bus. L.T. did not
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know the bus route – she did not even know the destination with any certainty.
(H.G. v. Carroll 2018, 14, emphasis in original)
Upon reading this, the audience is not able to simply dismiss L.T.’s situation. The short narrative
provides an ending but no closure, leaving the reader wondering whether L.T. arrives safely at
school, and inviting the reader to act on their concern. It prompts the audience to consider what its
role is in protecting such abandoned children. Ultimately, the excerpts above serve as
representative samples to demonstrate one way pathos is employed in Children’s Rights’ legal
rhetoric through narratively structured, detailed descriptions of the individual children’s stories.
Children’s Rights also utilizes pathos through the incorporation of powerful, emotionally
charged wording to make the text come alive to the reader. One example of this is the following
passage from G.L. v. Sherman: the plaintiffs “have been subjected to deplorable conditions” (1977,
2-3, emphasis added). The use of the word “deplorable” rather than “less than ideal,” “unsanitary,”
or some other milder verbiage more strongly conveys to the reader the vileness of the plaintiff’s
circumstances and emphasizes the extreme horror of the children’s living conditions.
In Juan F. v. Malloy, pathos is used repeatedly in ways similar to the following example:
“Services and placements to assist adolescents in DCYS care to make the transition to independent
living … are woefully inadequate in the state” (1989, 61, emphasis added). The intentional
incorporation of the word “woefully” reminds the reader than the violations being discussed in this
complaint should cause the audience grief and outrage. If “woefully” had been excluded, the
sentence would have still been structurally sound for a legal argument. However, the incorporation
of such an emotionally charged word makes the phrase more memorable and compelling in this
context where we would typically expect more clinical phrasing.
In Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie, pathos-laden sentences like the following are common:
“Plaintiffs Charlie and Nadine H … desperately want to be adopted” (1999, 10, emphasis added).
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Children’s Rights could have simply said the plaintiffs want to be adopted without including the
word “desperately.” However, choosing to add this one adverb helps convey the children’s feeling
of desperation to the audience and makes them sympathize more with the children’s situation.
Another example of emotionally-charged verbiage can be found in H.G. v. Carroll where
it says, “S.A. languished for nearly three more months in the restrictive SIPP facility” (2018, 2223, emphasis added). Instead of merely saying S.A. “spent” three months in the facility, Children’s
Rights chose to say “languished,” conveying a vivid image of a child wasting away in deplorable
conditions rather than simply passing time in a temporary home. All of the above quotations
provide details for the complaints that are unnecessary from a legal standpoint but increase the
emotional appeal of these cases, thereby making them more relatable and memorable for all
audiences, and especially those outside the legal system.
The final rhetorical pisteis to be examined in these complaints is ethos. Upon reviewing
each complaint, it is evident that while ethos is by no means a dominant rhetorical tool used,
excluding the 1977 G. L. v. Sherman complaint, every single other complaint intentionally includes
a short section demonstrating the rhetor’s (in this case Children’s Rights’) credibility and
competency as a legal practitioner. The following excerpt serves as a general representative sample
of the way ethos is employed in each of Children’s Rights’ complaints:
[The plaintiffs] are represented by attorneys employed by Children’s Rights, Inc., a
privately funded, non-profit organization with extensive experience in complex class
action litigation involving child welfare systems, and by attorneys associated with the law
firm of Lowenstein Sandler P.C. who have extensive experience in child welfare and civil
rights litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel have the resources, expertise and experience to
prosecute this action. (Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie 1999, 6)
Additional examples are easily found in these complaints with slight differences in the specific
law firms named. However, the way that these complaints establish the ethos of the litigators is
fairly typical of legal rhetoric more generally; unlike the innovations seen in the use of logical and
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pathetic appeals, Children’s Rights sticks to the conventions of the genre when it comes to ethos.
Establishing its ethos, even briefly, is a necessity for Children’s Rights, precisely because its legal
argumentation style related to logos and pathos is nonconventional. Therefore, it is vital that it
establishes early on in each complaint that it is expertly qualified to defend abused children in state
foster care systems so its cases are taken seriously and not disregarded by both legal and nonlegal
audiences.

Rhetorical Innovations for Future Legal Advocacy

Children’s Rights faces a dauting rhetorical challenge in advocating for children neglected
and harmed by the state-run foster care systems across the United States. While no one supports
the idea of children suffering or opposes the idea of improving the foster care system, it is still
difficult to mobilize individuals to take action to fix the system. This is due to several factors. Not
only are these children’s stories not often featured in the mainstream media, resulting in few people
actually knowing how broken the system is, but the abuses faced by these youths are heartbreaking
and difficult to deal with emotionally. It is easier for most people to just ignore what is happening
and tell themselves someone else with more training and experience will step up to do something
to fix it. Convincing everyday citizens that the foster care system is something they should care
about and have the responsibility to try to repair is an uphill battle.
Children’s Rights’ rhetorical challenge is exacerbated even further when operating in a
legal system that imagines its argumentation to be arhetorical, and discourages its practitioners
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from fully understanding and examining the rhetorical appeals at the heart of their practice. As we
saw earlier, legal scholars downplay or actively reject the intentional use of pathos in legal
argumentation, but my analysis suggests that Children’s Rights’ approach exemplifies an
innovative advocacy method that strategically combines a full range of rhetorical appeals to reach
multiple audiences. The question at hand now is whether or not its strategy effectively conveys to
both audiences the magnitude of the social injustice it is trying to rectify and is successful at
bringing about the desired positive social change. Is Children’s Rights’ method something to be
emulated by other advocacy organizations or is it unnecessarily long-winded and ineffective? I
believe my analysis suggests several lessons for both legal rhetoric scholars and future advocates.
First, Children’s Rights’ innovative advocacy approach offers a compelling alternative to
traditional legal rhetoric that can be adopted by other activism groups to bring about lasting,
positive social change. Second, the comparative analysis of complaints in this study demonstrates
the importance of maintaining a consistent advocacy model across individual cases. Finally, this
analysis identifies the need for expanded discussion between legal and rhetorical scholars to further
elucidate the rhetorical nature of legal argumentation.
First, regarding the overall success of Children’s Rights’ legal advocacy strategy, this study
has demonstrated that Children’s Rights employs an innovative approach that incorporates the
rhetorical appeal of pathos into more traditional logos-oriented legal argumentation. I contend that
the deployment of both in written pleadings allows Children’s Rights expanded opportunities to
bring about lasting, positive change in the U.S. child welfare system. The unique rhetorical
situation that compels Children’s Rights to appeal to two distinct audiences – those within and
beyond the legal system – forces Children’s Rights to bend the traditional confines of legal
complaint writing in order to effectively convey its message to both audiences. Although its
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nonconventional complaint writing style and atypical advocacy methods push the boundary of
(legal) advocacy norms, Children’s Rights’ rhetorical strategy appears to be successful. At the time
of writing this thesis, 11 of the 17 cases Children’s Rights had closed resolved in a consent decree
or settlement agreement. Its work has led to fewer Connecticut children being placed in
institutions, more children in Georgia receiving regular visits from their case workers, a reduction
in the number of children in Michigan growing up as permanent wards of the state, more siblinggroups being kept together in Tennessee, and numerous other successes (Children’s Rights 2020,
“Foster Care Reform”). By studying the ways Children’s Rights strategically employs the
rhetorical pisteis of logos and pathos in its legal advocacy, other advocacy groups can replicate
this model in hopes of achieving similar successful results.
However, this rhetorical model is not without limitations. First, it relies heavily on
extremely shocking stories to use emotional appeals to back up its logical arguments. This means
that an advocacy group attempting to bring about similar change through legal channels may not
be able to use this same rhetorical model if they are limited with fewer or less extreme stories that
will not resonate as powerfully with the audience. Additionally, Children’s Rights’ advocacy relies
heavily on logical arguments that appeal to relatively uncontested norms (e.g., that children should
not be harmed). If a similar advocacy movement was trying to make a case for change through the
legal system but was trying to argue for something less commonly agreed upon, they may find it
harder to construct as effective an argument using this method if their claims cannot be supported
by hegemonic ideals.
Second, regarding the specific way Children’s Rights’ employs logos within its legal
complaints, my analysis shows that consist repetition is a strength of the Children’s Rights
rhetorical approach. As such, I would contend that the deviation seen in Charlie & Nadine H. v.
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Christie is not very effective. Instead of using its typical deployment of paradigmatic arguments
first to later support syllogistic arguments, Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie begins with syllogistic
arguments, stating the major premises early in the complaint and then restating the minor premises
multiple times before concluding with paradigmatic arguments. Reversing the order in which
Children’s Rights deploys its syllogistic and paradigmatic arguments in this one complaint makes
it harder for the reader to follow Children’s Rights’ chain of logic and can confuse the audience
regarding exactly what argument Children’s Rights is making. Comparing the format of the other
four complaints that follow a consistent argumentation structure with the divergent structure used
in Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie, and seeing how much easier it is to follow the logical
arguments in the four complaints rather than that of Charlie & Nadine H. v. Christie, I conclude
that it is more effective for an advocacy organization to establish a uniform argumentation style
and apply it consistently rather than deviating from it and making it more difficult for the audience
to know what to expect and follow.
Finally, this study suggests that the broader scholarly conversation about the rhetorical
nature of legal argument would benefit from increased integration of legal and rhetorical
scholarship. As my survey of the existing literature made clear, legal scholars tend to downplay or
completely disregard the importance of rhetoric in legal argumentation. However, rhetoric is still
a key component of legal complaints, whether acknowledged or not, and Children’s Rights’ work
demonstrates that incorporating rhetorical pisteis into legal arguments in a more intentional,
strategic, and informed way can serve to strengthen one’s claims and more fully captivate one’s
audience, thereby strengthening one’s overall legal argument and advocacy efforts.
Finally, this limited examination of representative complaints from Children’s Rights’
advocacy does not exhaust all insight to be gleaned from analyzing the potential of innovative
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legal rhetoric. As such, future scholars interested in legal argumentation as a mode of rhetorical
advocacy aiming to bring about positive social change should next investigate how Children’s
Rights’ work and advocacy methods compare to strategies used by other activists working on
behalf of disadvantaged children domestically and globally. Work done by groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Bar Association Center on Children
and the Law should be examined to identify both the ways their advocacy methods and rhetorical
strategies are similar to and different from Children’s Rights’ approach. This analysis can help
expand on the work done in this thesis to continue refining advocacy strategies and ultimately
improve the lives of thousands of members of one of the United States’ most vulnerable
populations.

Conclusion

Studying Children’s Rights’ unconventional activism practices has revealed a new form of
advocacy that has the potential to ensure experiences like Kenny A’s from the opening complaint
are far less common and fewer children ever have to suffer again at the hands of those trusted to
protect them. Examining the use of pathos and logos in legal rhetoric, as expressed in five different
Children’s Rights’ complaints, has enabled us to identify rhetorical strategies that could create new
avenues within tradition legal pleadings to craft successful cases. This advocacy approach could
be expanded in the future by other activist groups working on a variety of social issues to protect
and improve other lives harmed in different broken systems outside state child welfare programs.
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This thesis has demonstrated this by (1) providing background information about Children’s
Rights’ work, (2) examining existing scholarship about the relationship between rhetoric and legal
argumentation, (3) closely analyzing five Children’s Rights’ complaints from the past forty years
to answer the rhetorical lines of inquiry identified in the literature review, and (4) explaining the
implications and limitations of its findings, both for rhetorical and legal scholars and future
advocacy movements.
Ultimately, I argue that Children’s Rights innovates an effective rhetorical strategy for
bringing about positive, lasting change through legal advocacy. The numerous successes of
Children’s Rights’ work are evidence of this claim. This analysis indicates that Children’s Rights’
advocacy model of intentionally combining rhetoric with legal argumentation within written
pleadings is invaluable, not only for future similar advocacy efforts, but also for saving and
improving the lives of thousands of children in the U.S. foster care system. Children’s Rights’
activism strategy has also provided a solution to the false choice many advocates sometimes fall
victim to, believing they must choose between advocating to either a legal audience or a public
audience, instead of realizing they can do both at the same time, as Children’s Rights has modeled.
Given how much is at stake for members of persecuted groups, such as the abused children
defended by Children’s Rights, we cannot overestimate the importance of crafting effective,
powerful rhetorical arguments for improving the world we live in. Children’s Rights’ model is a
compelling innovation since it has so much potential to be a force for good in the world. It is
essential to focus greater scholarly attention on the type of work Children’s Rights is doing and
the unique way it approaches the combination of rhetoric and legal argumentation, specifically in
written complaints. Ultimately, rhetorical scholarship is vital so we can continue to hone and refine
advocacy strategies to make the world a safer, better place.
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